By: Yubaraj Ghimire
Yet, can one expect that Bhattarai may be luckier that his predecessors who failed to keep similar promises? The hope pinned on him at home, in India, the EU, Scandinavian countries and the US is enormous. Will he be able to deliver? Or could that pressure be the cause of a quick downfall?
Bhattarai was the unchallenged ideologue of the decade-long insurgency that took nearly 14,000 lives. It ended in 2006, after Nepal’s seven major political parties and the insurgents came together on a common
agenda of peace, democracy and economic prosperity. Subsequently, parties agreed to have a new constitution drafted by an elected Constituent Assembly by May 2010, a task yet to be accomplished.
But after the elections to the CA in April 2008, the promised politics of consensus became the first casualty, as political parties started making deals for power, much against the spirit of the common agenda. Bhattarai is no exception. The Unified Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (UCPN-M) and the UDMF signed a four-point agreement. Bhattarai agreed not to form a “state restructuring commission”, something envisaged in the interim constitution, and in lieu of that got the UDMF’s support to have all cases pending against Maoist leaders and activists during the insurgency withdrawn. He agreed to initiate recruitment of upto 10,000 from Madhesi groups in the Nepal army amidst fears it may provoke other territorial and ethnic groups to have similar regiments.
For the Maoists, the Nepal army still remains the biggest obstacle in their mission to capture state power, democratically if possible, otherwise if required. A weak or confused army will be in their long-term interest. With the integration of at least 7,000 Maoist combatants at the top of Maoist priorities, and group entry from a single territory will have its own impact on the army’s morale. Control of power by the Maoist-Front alliance also marks the shift of state power from the hills to the plains decisively, and Bhattarai, despite his hill origin, has agreed to experiment. But it will not be easy for Bhattarai. Nepal’s two major parties — the
Nepali Congress and the Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) — have decided to sit in opposition. That will deprive the government of the two-thirds majority required to have the constitution adopted. But Bhattarai’s embittered relations with Maoistchief Prachanda and sharp division among top leaders in choosing the new ministers may be indicative of future trends. Prachanda believes
India was instrumental in bringing Bhattarai and Madhesi groups together.
Bhattarai pursued his higher education in India and his political ideology took shape during his time at Delhi’s JNU, then a left bastion. He opted for armed insurgency in Nepal upon his return when he felt dejected after a brief flirtation with the parliamentary system during 1991-94. Bhattarai also maintained a close link with his
school establishment and the United Mission to Nepal (UMN) associated or allied churches that currently enjoy enough clout in Nepal’s politics. During the past few years, he has also been able to convince the EU, Scandinavian countries and the US that he is actually pro-human rights, pro-foreign investment and a votary of industrial capitalism — that in essence he is everything that his party in principle is opposed to. At the same time, he has been able to keep his cadres happy by withdrawing cases against them, interestingly without drawing any flak from the human rights groups at home and abroad. Nonetheless, Bhatarai’s image as a “liberal democrat” is largely perceived and its efficiency untested.
But he is different from Prachanda in another sense. He identifies oneenemy at a time and builds a powerful lobby, domestic and international, to crush it. In 2005, it was the king; now, it is the Nepal army. However, there are much bigger odds against him this time round. The Madhesi Front constituents are fighting over plum
portfolios. His own party’s senior vice-chairman, Mohan Baidya, has opposed his decision to bringing Maoist combatants under an all-party special committee and to hand it the keys to weapon containers. Bhattarai took some populist decisions like using a local vehicle instead of an expensive imported one — but when he declared his family assets, he conveniently excluded his wife’s.
For Bhattarai, it is going to be a struggle to live up to his perceived image.
Baburam Bhattarai’s election as prime minister was smooth. The United Democratic Madhesi Front (UDMF), with 71 members in the parliament, decided to back him and helped give him the required majority. The next day, the House extended its tenure by three months without even a debate following an assurance from the new government that the peace process would be completed and the constitution delivered by November 30.
Yet, can one expect that Bhattarai may be luckier that his predecessors who failed to keep similar promises? The hope pinned on him at home, in India, the EU, Scandinavian countries and the US is enormous. Will he be able to deliver? Or could that pressure be the cause of a quick downfall?
Bhattarai was the unchallenged ideologue of the decade-long insurgency that took nearly 14,000 lives. It ended in 2006, after Nepal’s seven major political parties and the insurgents came together on a common
agenda of peace, democracy and economic prosperity. Subsequently, parties agreed to have a new constitution drafted by an elected Constituent Assembly by May 2010, a task yet to be accomplished.
But after the elections to the CA in April 2008, the promised politics of consensus became the first casualty, as political parties started making deals for power, much against the spirit of the common agenda. Bhattarai is no exception. The Unified Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (UCPN-M) and the UDMF signed a four-point agreement. Bhattarai agreed not to form a “state restructuring commission”, something envisaged in the interim constitution, and in lieu of that got the UDMF’s support to have all cases pending against Maoist leaders and activists during the insurgency withdrawn. He agreed to initiate recruitment of upto 10,000 from Madhesi groups in the Nepal army amidst fears it may provoke other territorial and ethnic groups to have similar regiments.
For the Maoists, the Nepal army still remains the biggest obstacle in their mission to capture state power, democratically if possible, otherwise if required. A weak or confused army will be in their long-term interest. With the integration of at least 7,000 Maoist combatants at the top of Maoist priorities, and group entry from a single territory will have its own impact on the army’s morale. Control of power by the Maoist-Front alliance also marks the shift of state power from the hills to the plains decisively, and Bhattarai, despite his hill origin, has agreed to experiment. But it will not be easy for Bhattarai. Nepal’s two major parties — the
Nepali Congress and the Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) — have decided to sit in opposition. That will deprive the government of the two-thirds majority required to have the constitution adopted. But Bhattarai’s embittered relations with Maoistchief Prachanda and sharp division among top leaders in choosing the new ministers may be indicative of future trends. Prachanda believes
India was instrumental in bringing Bhattarai and Madhesi groups together.
Bhattarai pursued his higher education in India and his political ideology took shape during his time at Delhi’s JNU, then a left bastion. He opted for armed insurgency in Nepal upon his return when he felt dejected after a brief flirtation with the parliamentary system during 1991-94. Bhattarai also maintained a close link with his
school establishment and the United Mission to Nepal (UMN) associated or allied churches that currently enjoy enough clout in Nepal’s politics. During the past few years, he has also been able to convince the EU, Scandinavian countries and the US that he is actually pro-human rights, pro-foreign investment and a votary of industrial capitalism — that in essence he is everything that his party in principle is opposed to. At the same time, he has been able to keep his cadres happy by withdrawing cases against them, interestingly without drawing any flak from the human rights groups at home and abroad. Nonetheless, Bhatarai’s image as a “liberal democrat” is largely perceived and its efficiency untested.
But he is different from Prachanda in another sense. He identifies oneenemy at a time and builds a powerful lobby, domestic and international, to crush it. In 2005, it was the king; now, it is the Nepal army. However, there are much bigger odds against him this time round. The Madhesi Front constituents are fighting over plum
portfolios. His own party’s senior vice-chairman, Mohan Baidya, has opposed his decision to bringing Maoist combatants under an all-party special committee and to hand it the keys to weapon containers. Bhattarai took some populist decisions like using a local vehicle instead of an expensive imported one — but when he declared his family assets, he conveniently excluded his wife’s.
For Bhattarai, it is going to be a struggle to live up to his perceived image.
(Courtesy: Indian Express)
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