By B Raman
Can the history of our humiliation at the hands of
China
in 1962 repeat itself? Security expert B Raman wonders
As we approach the 50th anniversary of the
humiliation next month, we have to analyse this question in depth in our
governmental national security community as well as outside.
It is important for the National Security Council
Secretariat to organise a series of brainstorming on this subject with the
participation of experts on China
from the government and outside.
The starting-point of such a brainstorming has to
be a presumption that the present efforts to solve our border dispute with China through
talks may not succeed and that we may be confronted with a fresh military confrontation
in the future.
Should such a confrontation arise, are we better
prepared to face it today than we were in 1962? If not, what are the
deficiencies still existing and how to remove them?
It is important for us to objectively identify the
factors that led to the 1962 humiliation and examine to what extent they have
been removed. It is also important to foresee what kind of new factors not seen
in 1962 could arise and what implications they could have for our capabilities.
It is my view that our ability to prevent another
humiliation in future would depend upon our trans-Himalayan military strategy
and capability as it did in 1962. The roles of the Army and the Air Force in
such a strategy will be pre-eminent. The role of the Navy will be marginal.
It will be our trans-Himalayan strategic mindset and tactical thinking
that will determine the future course of any new military confrontation with China as it did
in 1962.
I would identify the following as the basic causes of our humiliation
of 1962:
(a). Though our civilian and military intelligence agencies had a
satisfactory capability for the collection of infrastructure intelligence from
Tibet, their capability for the collection of war indicators from Tibet was
very poor.
They detected in time the clandestine Chinese construction of roads
such as the Aksai Chin road in the Western sector, but they missed the Chinese
preparations for a military foray into our territory.
The Chinese attack on our positions must have been preceded by weeks,
if not months, of preparations on the ground in Tibet. The war indicators caused by
such preparations were missed by our intelligence agencies.
(b).Our capability for the analysis and assessment of China-related
intelligence was inadequate. Even the limited intelligence flowing from Tibet from
human and technical sources was not subjected to vigorous analysis and
assessment.
Our knowledge and assessment of the Chinese military thinking and
mindset were poor. We hardly knew anything about the India expertise in the PLA and the
Chinese intelligence.
As a result, we seriously underestimated the Chinese political and
military will to assert their ground interests across the Himalayas
and over-assessed and over-projected our capability to anticipate and
neutralise any Chinese assertion of their will.
(c). Inadequate professionalism in our armed forces and their inability
to foresee different scenarios that could arise and identify the available
options. This lack of professionalism was seen right across the board --from
the failure to procure the military stores that would be required for a
trans-Himalayan war to readapting the training of our officers.
The army went into war with very little training and experience in
mountain warfare and with very few equipment for such a warfare.
(d). The inexperience of our political leadership in military-related
decision-making and in enforcing the implementation of the decisions taken.
My assessment of the present position regarding these factors is as
follows:
(a).Our intelligence collection capability in Tibet has
improved. Our intelligence agencies are unlikely to miss war indicators in Tibet as badly
as they did in 1962.
(b). Our analysis and assessment capability has improved over what it
was in 1962, but continues to be inadequate. The Chinese language capability of
our national security community is worse than what it was in 1962 and in the
years immediately thereafter. Our ability to understand and analyse the Chinese
military mind-set and thinking continues to be poor.
Whatever capability we have built up in this regard has been largely
influenced by Western thinking and analysis without an independent application
of our mind.
Our analysis and assessment infrastructure in respect of China-related
intelligence lags behind our analysis and assessment infrastructure in respect
of Pakistan-related intelligence.
We can anticipate, analyse and counter Pakistan
better than we can China.
There are wild swings in our assessments on China --from alarmism on the one
side to total complacency on the other.
(c).The professionalism of our Armed Forces has improved. They are
better equipped, better trained and better led for a trans-Himalayan warfare
today. But, there is a lack of convergence of thinking between the Army and the
Air Force on the one side and the Navy on the other as to what China implies
for our national security and armed forces.
There is inadequate integrated joint staff thinking in the armed forces
as a whole on China.
There is a newly-acquired fascination for naval power and an inadequate
appreciation of the continuing importance of military (army related) and air
power.
(d). The understanding of our political class in matters relating to
strategic decision-making on China
is inadequate though it is better than what it was in 1962 and the years
before.
There is a clear understanding in our political class of China as a political and economic competitor,
but inadequate comprehension of China
as a military factor.
Two new factors that have made their appearance since 1962 have not
received adequate attention in our national security community:
(a). The Chinese search for alternate means of taking India by surprise. In 1962, they
took us by surprise because our intelligence agencies had little capability for
collecting war indictors from the ground in Tibet. The Chinese no longer enjoy
this advantage.
The increasing Chinese emphasis on the role of the helicopter-borne
operations of their Army has to be seen in the context of their search for new
means of taking India
by surprise -- particularly in Arunachal Pradesh.
The equipping and training of the copter wing of their Army is
receiving increasing attention with some major exercises already noticed.
(b). The Chinese testing and fine-tuning of integrated techniques of an
Army-Air Force role in defending Tibet from external threats and in
asserting their will trans Himalayas. There has been an increase in the number
of Air Force exercises in Tibet.
Not adequate knowledge of Chinese Air Force exercises in Yunnan is available, but my surmise is that in any future
military confrontation with India,
the Chinese will use their Air Force defensively from Tibet and offensively from Yunnan.
In 1962, the entire North Myanmar was
a political, administrative and military vacuum. The Myanmar
government presence has since improved in the Rakhine (old Arakan) and Chin
areas bordering Bangladesh,
but remains the same in the Kachin State bordering Yunnan.
The Kachin State and Yunnan
are very important in any trans-Himalayan military strategy. We continue to
neglect these two important regions from the point of view of our intelligence
coverage as we were doing before 1962.
The Kachin State is important for defending our North East in
any new confrontation with China.
The Rakhine State
is important for our Indian Ocean objectives
and our energy security.
I do not consider it necessary to touch upon the nuclear aspect in
this analysis. It has to be discussed in camera.
Courtesy:
Rediffnews.com, September 17, 2012
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