By: Keshav Prasad Bhattarai
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| Keshav Prasad Bhattarai |
During the UN Conference on
Sustainable Development at Rio de Janeiro last month, Chinese Premier Wen
Jiabao exhibited his surprisingly new found enthusiasm for a meeting with his
Bhutanese counterpart Jigmi Y Thinley – the first ever high level meeting
between the two countries that are yet to establish diplomatic relations. Next
to India, a gripping fact is that China does not have any negotiated border
agreements with its tiny neighbor in its South – Bhutan.
According to Xinhua both leaders
expressed their willingness to establish formal diplomatic ties and Chinese
premier highly appreciated Bhutan’s staunch support for its policy on Taiwan
and Tibet.
Chinese Prime Minister pledged
for his commitment “to forge formal diplomatic relations with Bhutan on the
basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”. Wen further assured
Prime Minister Thinley that it respects Bhutan’s choice for its developmental
path as per its national conditions and revealed eagerness to conclude the
border demarcation at an early date.
The agreement between Bhutan and
China in 1998 that was aimed to maintain peace and tranquility on the
Bhutan-China Border was considered as a major diplomatic feat for Thimpu. In an
explicit term, the agreement, for the first time had acknowledged Bhutan as a
sovereign country with a promise to respect the “territorial integrity and
independence of Bhutan”. Quite contrary on the other hand, India recognized
Bhutan as a sovereign independent country only on February 2007, after both the
country revised the 1949 Treaty that used to have a provision that read- “The
Government of India undertakes to exercise no interference in the internal
administration of Bhutan” and in return “Bhutan agrees to be guided by the
advice of the Government of India in regard to its external relations”.
(Article 2)
But in the updated treaty in 2007
the article as mentioned above is revised as follows -” . . .the Government of
the Kingdom of Bhutan and the Government of the Republic of India shall
cooperate closely with each other on issues relating to their national
interests. Neither Government shall allow the use of its territory for
activities harmful to the national security and interest of the other.”
And obviously since 2007, Bhutan
in both principle and practice has been enjoying the status of an independent
sovereign country with its new found national confidence in building its
international image. However for all practical purposes; India shall continue
to make close monitoring of Bhutan’s external dealings and if necessary will
try to mentor it. Even so, the huge strategic transport and communication
facility including five access roads built by China around Bhutan and the huge
global geo-political weight that China has gained of late, will continue to
confront India with its role in South Asian affairs including Nepal and Bhutan.
Bhutan is a UN member since 1971
and has its permanent missions in New York and Geneva. It has widened its
diplomatic relations with 39 countries, has its embassies in Bangkok, Brussels,
Dhaka, Kuwait and New Delhi, but in Thimpu only Bangladesh and India have their
embassies. None of the five permanent members of UN Security council have
diplomatic relations with Bhutan. But once it maintains diplomatic relations
with China, U.S. will immediately follow it and soon Bhutan’s geo-political
location will accumulate worldwide attraction. Unfortunately, if Bhutan fails
to manage it with strong will and diplomatic skill, it may confront similar
challenges that Nepal faces today.
The Dragon at the door of
India’s vulnerable “Chicken Neck”
Chumbi valley, a vital
tri-junction between Bhutan, India and China is just 5 kilometer away from one
of India’s vital life line – the narrow stretch of land with just 20 km wide
and 200 km long called as ‘Siliguri Corridor’ bordering Bangladesh, Bhutan and
Nepal. The strip of land is also known as ‘India’s ‘Chicken Neck’ joining
India’s mainland with its seven states in the North East that makes it the most
vulnerable strategic part of India.
Bhutan and China share about 470
km long adjoining borders and have disputes over some territory since China
annexed Tibet. After the 19th round of border talks in Thimphu on January 2010,
both countries are near to resolve their disputed areas covering some 764
square kilometers – 269 sq km in the North West and 495 sq km on Central North.
Interestingly, while Bhutan and China started the border meeting they had some
1000 square kilometer of disputed area. But now it is narrowed down only 764
and even from among the 764 it is learnt that China has proposed an exchange of
Pasamlung and Jakarlung valleys with an area of 495 sq km with 269 sq km
pasture land in some parts of Chumbi Valley in the North West – a sensitive
geo-strategic location adjoining Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet and close to Siliguri
Corridor.
Chumbi valley on the one side is
flank by Paunhuri peaks and the other by Chomulhuri peaks that joins the tri-junction
of China, Bhutan and India looming large over Siliguri Corridor. If Bhutan is
prepared to concede the other 269 sq km disputed area in Chumbi valley to
China, the huge neighbor in the North may reward Bhutan with a lucrative large
chunk of territory and other benefits that Bhutan wants. And the elected
government of Bhutan and the oxford educated young and energetic king Khesar
Jigme Namgyal Wangchuk may find it hard to reject, if China comes with such a
concrete proposal including returning to 1951 border line that has existed
between Bhutan and Tibet.
China is said to planning to
extend its railway networks at least at four points in South Asia from Nathu La
(Sikkim), Chhumbi Valley (China, India- Bhutan), Kodari (Nepal) and Nyangtri
(Arunachal Pradesh). Bangladesh has also requested China to extend railway link
to China from Dohazari in Chittagong via Mynmar. Besides China has developed
railways as well as extensive all weather road and advanced communication
networks in border areas joining neighboring South Asian countries.
This way, as China has increased
its geo-political weight in South Asia, it has stirred India at an alarming
level. According to Times of India Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, during
his meeting with some editors in September 2010 came up with unusually blunt
remarks when he said “China would like to have a foothold in South Asia and we
have to reflect on this reality. We have to be aware of this.”
China’s second defense line
and India’s northern security
The high rise of ethnic politics
among the people of Mongol origin and tribal communities in Eastern hills of
Nepal may have cross border implications upon Gorkhaland agitation in West
Bengal. The predominantly Mongolian and tribal population of Bhutan, Sikkim and
mainly North Eastern Indian states engaged in decades long insurgencies since
Indian Independences sooner or later may find a sense of unity and affinity
with Nepali ethnic states. And in due course of time with increased transport
and communication with the people across the border, the sense of unison seen
among people of Nepal’s Terai with people across border and strategic
challenges Nepal has to confront with, may be repeated among people of Mongol
and tribal communities living in Northern belt of South Asia extending from
India’s North East to Western Nepal with people across border to North. When
identity based politics goes stronger a new geo-political scenario may appear
in South Asia.
On the other hand, Indian leaders
and top officials have described Maoist insurgency as the single biggest
internal-security challenge the country have ever faced. It has spread rapidly
over one third of India’s 626 districts. Obviously they have gained
inspirations from Maoist in Nepal – that has emerged as the largest political
party of the country. The division in ruling Maoist party in Nepal and
formation of a new under “Kiran” may give Indian Maoist a new boost – making
strong presence along the Indian hart land contiguous to Silliguri Corridor.
According to Indian media sources
radical communist and other separatist groups that are trained and sheltered in
Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan and Burma may create havoc in case India is attacked
by Pakistan in Kashmir and by China in Arunachal Pradesh. In such a situation Chinese
forces stationed in Chhumbi valley may be lured to share the pie in India’s
Chicken Neck.
Apparently, stronger voice raised
in Nepal in favor of ethnicity based communal political forces from Tarai to
Himalayan region and the demand for the provinces clearly demarcated along
ethnic line are supposed to have political and financial support from India and
some Western countries. This on the one hand has alienated large number of
people enlightened with western and Indian political and cultural values. On
the other hand, those alienated this way have been looking China as a great
friend of Nepali nationalism.
Together with this if Nepal in
future is forced to create ethnic provinces in hills and Himalayas, by nature
of ethnic affinity they will oriented more toward China in reaction against
India supported Madhesh based politics in Nepal. In such a situation a weak and
fragile central government may not run its writ throughout the country.
Resultantly China might be engaged extensively with hill based provinces that
will work as a second line of its defense next to Tibet that will indubitably
be detrimental to Indian security in general and its Northern belt in
particular.
Courtesy: The Reporter, August
20, 2012
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