, August 14, 2012
The past few months have been an
exciting phase in Bhutan’s foreign policy. Some political analysts are
questioning Bhutan’s resistance to establishing diplomatic ties with China,
while others have asserted publicly that Bhutan-China relations are inevitable
and would become a diplomatic reality in the years to come. Amidst these
competing voices, Bhutan, for its part, has officially maintained silence over
the issue. An obvious pointer to this was the way Bhutan chose silence in the
wake of media reports in China and India about the interaction on developing
Sino-Bhutan relations between the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and Bhutanese
Prime Minister Jigme Thinley at the sidelines of the Rio+20 summit.
Significantly, the official mouth piece of Bhutan, The Kuensel, totally
ignored the issue. However, a popular daily, The Bhutanese, mentioned
categorically, on the basis of a Press Release issued by the Prime Minister’s
office, that the “local Chinese media had misreported that Bhutan and China
will establish diplomatic ties.”
Even as the dust was settling on
this episode, a controversy about certain tenders being qualified to procure
Chinese buses brought the China factor to the fore. According to a media
source, in July 2012, a tender was given to Global Traders and Gangjung (GT),
which is a supplier of Chinese vehicles. Significantly, the company’s owner is
the Bhutanese Prime Minister’s son-in-law. While there has been some
controversy about the transparency of the tendering process, the mandated
authority, Bhutan Post Corporation Limited (BPCL), has publicly stated in a
clarification letter that TATA city buses— imported from India by Samden
Vehicles (SV)—had started giving problems in their first year of operation.
Though SV has challenged the final decision of BPCL, the episode is however
symbolic of Bhutan’s interest in Chinese goods and also speaks of China’s
influence on various stakeholders in Bhutan’s domestic politics. However, this
is not the first time that such linkages have come out in the public domain.
In 2010, the fifth National
Assembly debate in Bhutan had noted that China had already offered to invest in
projects related to health and education services. Some scholars have even
written about the growing domestic interest in Bhutan to engage with China.
Caroline Brassard, for instance, has mentioned the growing pressure put by the
private sector, including the Bhutan Chambers of Commerce, on the government to
resolve the boundary dispute.1
It can be said that the undercurrent for this pressure is to facilitate the aim
of establishing economic relations with China. This became evident during the
author’s interaction with the Vice President of Bhutan Chambers of Commerce and
Industry who argued that a limited transactional status with China would
benefit the Bhutanese economy since at present all the goods imported from
China have to pass through the Calcutta port, which adds to the transactional
issues and thus increases the costs of imported Chinese goods.2
Further, while local shopkeepers in Thimpu publicly deny that Chinese goods are
being smuggled into Bhutan, it was found that Chinese goods are already
filtering in through the North-Western borders in an informal (illegal) manner.3
Thus, while the interest to engage with China is very much present in Bhutan,
the caveat of an unsettled boundary dispute remains.
Tsering Tobgay, the opposition
leader in Bhutan and President of the People’s Democratic Party believes that
the demarcation of the boundary is a precondition for establishing diplomatic
and economic ties with China. Tobgay, who represents the Haa constituency,
argues that for Bhutan, demarcation of the boundary is akin to gaining a
respectful place in the international comity. He also believes that the demarcation
of the boundary is a precondition for a peaceful neighbourhood since, in the
absence of a settled boundary, Bhutan could become a potential flashpoint for
the two nuclear Asian powers—India and China.4
Some of these sentiments were
recently reiterated by Fu Ying, the Vice Foreign Minister of China. During his visit
to Bhutan for the 20th round of the Sino-Bhutan boundary talks, the Chinese
minister stated:
“We (China) are willing to work
with Bhutan towards early establishment of diplomatic relations. The border
dispute between the two countries does not cover a wide area. The two sides
should speed up border talks in the spirit of mutual understanding and
accommodation, with a view to arriving at a fair and reasonable and mutually
acceptable solution. This will contribute to peace and stability in our border areas.
We are ready to encourage Chinese businesses to expand their exports to Bhutan
and welcome more people-to-people exchanges and tourism, which will help
increase the mutual knowledge and friendship between our two people. We believe
that Bhutan is well-placed to grasp the opportunity of the development of China
and India and benefit from the great historical renaissance of Asia. Maximizing
these opportunities will help Bhutan open up a new era of development.”5
Instructive as this statement is
about the keen interest in China to engage Bhutan, it also in many ways reveals
the confidence and the readiness of the Chinese to settle the boundary dispute
with Bhutan.
While Bhutan-China relations are
a matter of bilateral concern and should not be filtered through the Indian
prism, the nature of the boundary dispute perhaps needs elaboration. This is
because a settled boundary dispute is a precondition for facilitating
diplomatic ties between China and Bhutan. The very fact that the boundary talks
have been prolonged for almost four decades speaks a lot about the nature and
the tradeoffs embedded in the dispute. If the dispute were to be settled along
the lines of the package deal6
proposed by the Chinese, China could move further South thus occupying the
Doklam plateau and attain strategic leverage and an offensive advantage over
the Chumbi Valley. This, in the long term, could make the Siliguri corridor—the
choke point that connects mainland India to its North East—vulnerable.
The question of Sino-Bhutan
diplomatic relations, which is essentially linked to a settled boundary line,
thus becomes a matter of strategic choice for Bhutan. The question to be asked
therefore is whether Bhutan is prepared to make the strategic bargain. It would
not be an exaggeration to state that with huge Indian investments in Bhutan’s
economy, such a choice could be difficult at least until 2020 primarily due to
the nature of hydel cooperation between India and Bhutan. If China seeks to
replace India, is Bhutan ready to be flooded with Chinese goods, more so when
its industrial belt essentially lies in the South. Some experts claim that
China has interests in the timber resources of Bhutan.7 Will Bhutan be ready to make a ‘green’
sacrifice, given that preservation of natural resources has been a policy priority
for Bhutan.
These are some tough questions
which Bhutan’s policy makers will have to address. The question of Bhutan
engaging China thus needs to be addressed at two levels. First, what will be
the nature of a settled boundary dispute and is there a perceived middle way to
resolve it? Second, what will be the nature and magnitude of Bhutan’s economic
engagement with China and how will this equation impact upon Bhutan’s
interaction with India? Addressing these two questions and finding a balance are
essential before anything definitive can be said about the inevitability of
Bhutan-China diplomatic relations.
Dr. Medha Bisht is Assistant
Professor at the Department of International Relations, South Asian University,
New Delhi. She can be contacted at medha.bisht@gmail.com.
1.
Caroline Brassard, “Bhutan: Cautiously Cultivated Positive Perception,” in S.D.
Muni and Tan Tai Yong (eds), A Resurgent China: South Asian Perspective,
New Delhi: Routledge, 2012, p. 76.
2.
Author’s interview with Thinley Palden, May 19, 2012, Thimpu, Bhutan.
3.
Author’s interaction with local shopkeepers and residents in Thimpu, May 14-21,
2012.
4.
Author’s interview with Tsering Tobgay, Opposition Leader, May 16, 2012.
5.
Fu Ying, “It is time for China and Bhutan to develop bridges of Friendship and
Cooperation,” Kuensel Online, August 9, 2012, at:
http://www.kuenselonline.com/2011/?p=35042.
6.
Medha Bisht, “Sino-Bhutan Boundary Negotiations: Complexities of a Package
Deal,” IDSA Comment, January 19, 2010, at: http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/Sino-BhutanBoundaryNegotiations_mbisht_1....
7.
Brassard, note 1, p. 83.
Courtesy: IDSA
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