By Suhas Chakma
AS NEPAL Prime Minister Baburam Bhattarai
left for the Rio+20 Summit in Brazil on 18 June, the hardline
faction of the Maoists led by Mohan Vaidya announced the split of the United
Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists). India
appears to be relieved at the split, but as the country having the most
significant stake on Nepal,
it ought to rethink its policy of the last decade.
By the time the Maoist insurgents
paralysed Nepal, India had
already burnt its fingers with the LTTE. It provided unstinted support to
political parties as well as King Gyanendra until democratic processes
abolished the institution of monarchy. To his credit, Gyanendra had managed to
split the Maoists, with Bhattarai being demoted by the Maoist supremo
Prachanda. An intervention of a senior leader of the CPI(M) — then partner of
the UPA-I government — facilitated reconciliation between Prachanda and
Bhattarai.
India successfully facilitated
signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Maoists and
other political parties in 2006. However, India maintained its dual policy on
the Maoists. On one hand, it facilitated mediation between over-ground
political parties led by GP Koirala, who often checked into the aiims for
checkups only to slip away to hold dialogue with Prachanda in Noida. On the other
hand, senior Maoist leaders like Mohan Vaidya and CP Gajurel were rotting in
Indian jails. They turned against India.
Since the signing of the CPA, India’s policy on Nepal has been sliding. Then envoy
Rakesh Sood continued to implement the policy articulated by National Security
Advisor MK Narayanan, acquiring the nickname ‘Viceroy’. The musical chairs for
Prime Ministership continued but Prime Minister Madhav Nepal and
Jhalanath Khanal of the UML failed to deliver on the peace process in the
absence of cooperation from the Maoists.
India
started engaging with Bhattarai, who frequented Delhi, much to the consternation of
India-baiters amongst the Maoists. Once Bhattarai became Prime Minister at the
expense of Prachanda in August 2011, India sensed the success of its
policy. Bhattarai further delivered on one of the stumbling blocks of the peace
process: disbanding the People’s Liberation Army. He also appeared to be
committed to the unwritten agreement to hand over the chair to the NC after
adoption of the Constitution to hold general elections.
As the deadline for adoption of
the Constitution neared on 27 May, the NC and the UML refused to accept
ethnicity-based federalism or allow vote in the Constituent Assembly on the
issue. Bhattarai, taking advantage of the Supreme Court order to adopt the
constitution or hold fresh elections, dissolved the Constituent Assembly and
announced Constituent Assembly election for November 2012.
India is at a loss currently and
has failed to read the situation on many counts. First, India
underestimates the support base of the Maoists. Second, India and its security analysts considered that
Prachanda’s era had come to an end after his fourth phase of campaign against India was
called off unilaterally in December 2010. Further, the middle class in Kathmandu publicly opposed Prachanda’s bandhs. This
author consistently held that with the declaration of 11 ethnic-based provinces
during his movement against India,
Prachanda had decimated independent leadership of the Janjati groups with one
stroke.
Third, for its engagement with
the Maoists, India
emphasised on splitting the Maoists around relations with India. This
only impacted the hardliners while Prachanda and Bhattarai increasingly found
themselves on the same page as their political future is dependent on each
other. The agreement reached with the NC and UML on 15 May provided for a
directly elected President sharing powers with the Prime Minister elected from
the bicameral Parliament. Prachanda and Bhattarai sensed the possibility of a
Putin-Medvedev style arrangement in Nepal and this has been one of the
critical factors for dissolution of the CA and announcement for election. The
unwritten agreement no longer mattered.
FOURTH, WHILE India had sought disbanding of the PLA as desired
by the Nepal Army, India
had no position on the question of federalism despite the issue being the
centre of New Nepal. India
was caught between its support for the Madhesis’ demand for meaningful
federalism and the Maoists increased support amongst the Janjatis through
ethnicity-based federalism. Consequently, India
failed to impress upon the NC and the UML that Nepal
is no longer about Kathmandu valley: The peripheries have become the centre of Nepal’s
politics and aspirations of the Janjatis and the Madhesis must be addressed.
Currently, the Maoists and India appear to be on the same page on the
question of federalism in Nepal
but schisms developed over the last decade endure. The split of the Maoists
makes the game wide open.
Suhas Chakma is the director
of the New Delhi-based Asian Centre for Human Rights.
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