President Obama sealed a meeting
today with visiting Philippine President Benigno Aquino III in a pledge to
continue shoring up the Southeast Asian ally’s weak naval flank.
The
White House promised more technical and military support on top of the
transferred Coast Guard craft that brushed up against a Chinese fishing fleet
in recent days in contested waters in the South China Sea.
Filipinos
saw the incident as the latest in a string of resource-territorial inroads
by the Chinese.
The Philippines-China disputes,
and the presence of the U.S.
in them, are described in depth in an
article in today’s Wall Street Journal (this may be behind a paywall). But
the ongoing South China Sea maneuvering involves not just Manila but the other members of ASEAN*, too,
directly or indirectly. Vietnam,
especially, has a history of rubs with China, including outright military
conflict. Today it contests China
over fishing and energy riches. Yet like most nations in the region, Vietnam is torn
when it comes to the rising regional power–China is by far its biggest trading
partner. The Chinese have amassed powerful suasion.
But the U.S. has many
cards to play as well. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta was wrapping up
a
swing through Asia as Aquino met with his boss. The military minister
visited Singapore, where America looks to expand its naval ties, Vietnam and India. The Singapore stop
included a larger annual meeting called Shangri-La, a pan-Asian “security
dialogue.” That event puts the South China Sea matters in a larger framework
that includes North Asia (Sea of Japan), the Taiwan
and Malacca straits and the Indian Ocean.
All of which happens also to involve China, whether anyone likes it or
not.
With its massive military
buildup, and of course its impressive economic might, China is
pursuing a grand strategy in all directions. It seeks to wean Japan away from
a Westward focus with enticing commercial lures. (Ditto Australia, with
more difficulty.) It holds whatever sway can be held on North Korea, and is therefore vital to Seoul. It is playing a
waiting game (let us hope) with Taiwan
over ultimate unification. It plays different cards with each of the ASEAN
nations, often with fewer friction points than occur with the Philippines and Vietnam. (The cases of Malaysia and
Thailand will be particularly key to watch.) It keeps Burmese interests
close even as that country’s generals fitfully open to the larger world and
their own people as well. And it moves,
through
Pakistan especially , to outflank historic rival India and reach natural and secure
trading routes.
(China
meantime also is looking east, to Central Asia and its resource riches, where
it is trying to broker a complementary relationship with Russia. China and Russia have one of the world’s most
complex relationships–as diplomatic allies, arms-selling competitors and
economic counterweights.)
As with any intricate weave of
rights, grievances, ethnic strains and geography, the economic and military
chess of the Asian oceans has its share of ironies. One of them: well-situated
Taiwan, being of course the Republic of China, is by historical imperative a
natural ally of Beijing when its comes to territorial claims by non-Chinese.
But the mainland cannot make formal use of Taiwan’s good offices, because
People’s Republic of China protocol holds that there is no Republic of China
and hence no seat at the table.
But quirks aside, this jockeying
for regional power and position is a serious business. There are treaty
obligations between the U.S.
and the Philippines
that could be a tripwire. The rules of engagement that normally govern armed
forces are clouded by the fact that China employs layers of
quasi-military commercial forces at the maritime front lines. (This, in turn,
might be a blessing if shooting starts and China can deny that its own navy was
involved, thus saving face short of full-on hostilities.)
In the medium to long term, where
should this push and pull lead? To an Asia of free trade and rule of law, is
the
Washington
mantra. China
will be the most important piece. But others will be given space to grow, even
as the mainland drops some of its Communist Party strictures and
resource-hoarding tendencies, both of which disrupt normal commerce. The U.S. stays present to provide a comfort factor
and discourage the kind of populist zeal that always has the potential to stir
age-old hatreds and bring Asia to internecine
violence and destruction again.
Is that a pollyannish scenario?
Is the U.S. instead embarked
on a “containment” course vis a vis China that is every bit as
resource-focused as the Chinese enlargement push? Or, alternatively, is Washington merely
patting the heads of ASEAN leaders, propping up the dominoes for as long as it
can while it engineers a budget-constrained strategic retreat to its North
American bunker? (In other words, is Obama’s “Asian pivot” merely a feint?)
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